

Regional Security and Good Governance

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Abstract

Governance, like globalization, is over used but under studied. It conjures different meanings to different users precisely because it is complex, multi faceted and multi disciplined. It covers various issues; thus a wide cross section of participants would like to see their mark on the governance aspect of their interest areas. The 1980s introduced the norms of civil society and the associated concept of governance. On its heel followed global governance, including the features of an international civil society, only this time it would be applicable on a global scale. But why such a coverage? Why must governance be either national or international? Can governance and civil society occur at the regional level – i.e. regional governance - pursuing the characteristics of the global at the regional? Can it also include matters of security? The following is a modest attempt in applying the existing framework to studying governance within the regional context of Southeast Asia and to seek answers to such questions as: will regional governance in security promise a higher probability of peace and stability for its members? Will it deliver where global governance has faltered? Will regional civil society be able to play a role?

Global Governance

The emergence of good governance as a desirable phenomenon was largely related to the state's domestic environment. Good governance relates to nation building, democratization, rule of law, and institution building to promote a civil society. Good governance requires a plurality of interested participants at various levels of the state. Societies under such a tradition are also internationally linked; national leaders provide accountability for their policies and actions to local or international institutions as they adhere to universal norms and practices.

While the state, as the most important political unit, pursued governance within its confine, a certain degree of global governance was already in existence (though not called by such a term). Through international organizations like the United Nations (established in 1945) and the practice of international law that superseded even the

United Nations or the League of Nations, global governance had taken shape. International law - the global legal framework - established guidelines through existing norms, principles and treaties. International regimes, on the other hand, were more issue specific, and provided the rules and expectations of state behavior around an agreed area of activity. Thus international organizations, regimes and legal norms/structures, are complementary in a global environment of mutually acceptable behavior. A global civil society would thus be the ideal outcome if various participants interact with formal and informal structures and processes. The past five decades has seen the emergence of global governance and global civil society.

Similar to the apparatus at the state level, global governance involves a multiplicity of actors and processes; but unlike the state system, it operates within a decentralized framework. Over the years the international system has expanded to include several inter governmental organizations (IGOs), international non governmental organizations (INGOs), transnational actors and public and private coalitions that invariably influence policies and performance of international activities, be it in political, economic, environment or humanitarian areas. The distinguishing factor is that global governance does not involve any form of 'governing' or 'government'. There are no hierarchical structures or well defined policy makers, although global governance affects various aspects of human interactions across the globe. While governments exercise 'centralized' authority, governance implies 'fragmented' authority.¹

Global governance, according to some entails "...efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually. Global governance implies an absence of central authority, and the need for collaboration or cooperation among governments and others who seek to encourage common practices and goals in addressing global issues."² Simply stated, "global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained".³ International cooperation by various actors is thus crucial in order to achieve some desired values (for example, in humanitarian, environmental or peace strategies). Nevertheless, transparency, accountability and participation are still the main criteria in good global governance, although it deals in a more complex international system. Institution building and practices in global governance have become more extensive with the globalization of the world economy and concerns over the depletion of natural resources. Yet the effective role of international organizations and groups is still vital to the maintenance of good governance although a clear distinction should be made between

¹ A number of scholars have dealt with the topic. See for example, James N Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ed., *Governance Without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Oran R. Young, *Governance in World Affairs* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999); Charlotte Ku and Thomas G Weiss, ed., *Toward Understanding Global Governance* (Providence, RI: ACUNS, 1998).

² Leon Gordenker and Thomas G Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions" in Thomas G Weiss and Leon Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 17-50, p. 17.

³ James N Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century", in *Global Governance*, Vol 1, No 1, 1995, pp.13-44, p.13.

arrangements amongst just states versus cooperation amongst a wider group of states, individuals and institutions.⁴

The plurality of actors and the rapid advancement in communication imply the multiplication of views on issues. International organizations are sometimes on the receiving end of critiques. Dissatisfaction in global governance has led to protest by certain sectors of the globalized community. Initially such acts were confined to the national level but later spread to other locations; for example, the demonstrations against the policies of the WTO in Seattle or the IMF in Washington or against the increased role of certain rich or powerful states in the world system. The UN as the largest representative organization is the closest to a comprehensive model of global governance. However, in order for governance to be effective, it needs to entertain a larger input from non-state actors and not just limit to its 190 member states' governments. In that respect, the world body has been involved with a large cross section of the world population over a variety of issues but it cannot avoid being influenced by certain state actors. In addition there are always the rogue states and dominant powers that fail in transparency and accountability, thus disrupting global governance.⁵

Regional Contribution

Global governance, especially in the fields of collective security and economic development, has been the main public concern of states. Policies targeted at such a macro level may result in ambiguity. Alternative approaches to global governance may provide parallel actions to address common concerns within a geographical context. Global governance, while having the support of the international system may by itself be inadequate in addressing certain issues. Other variations of governance at the national, sub regional and regional levels thus complement global governance. However, there appears a missing link at the regional governance. The influence of international civil society has influenced national level governance in most states, but has not yet been influential at the regional level, except perhaps at the most successful of regional groupings like the European Community. One may argue that in that particular situation, the reverse, that is, the national level impact of good governance has had a major impact on regional and global civil society concerns. But in other regions, the most likely outcome appears to be the spillover of globally initiated governance practices.

A regional civil society or regional governance is in its infancy in most parts of the world as states have concentrated at the global processes rather than at regional mechanism. That may partly be due to the role of the United Nations as the first major

⁴ For a stimulating discussion see, Ngaire Woods, "Good Governance in International Organizations" in *Global Governance*, Vol 5, No 1, 1999, pp. 39-61; also, Edward Comor, "The Role of Communication in Global Civil Society" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol 45, No3, 2001, pp.389-408.

⁵ For a comprehensive treatment by a group of eminent personalities see, Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). For a different perspective on internationalism see, Robert W Cox, "An Alternative Approach to Multilateralism for the Twenty-first Century" in *Global Governance*, Vol 3, No 1, 1997, pp.103-116.

player since the forties, even if in actual practice it may not have been as successful in instilling universal values as it would have liked to. Unfortunately, most national governments have viewed global governance with suspicion; it is sometimes perceived as collusion amongst the powerful actors and as a threat to national sovereignty. Hence, how more negatively perceived would be attempts at regional governance? The threat of interference in domestic decision making over issues like human rights and environmental protection has strengthened the resolve of states to guard their national prerogatives. They thus appear less enthusiastic about exposing themselves to another layer for transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, it is evident that globalization issues are transforming sovereignty; states are becoming more and more intertwined with the rest of the international system on a wide range of issue areas.⁶

Once groups of states are convinced that their national regimes will not be undermined by external forces (especially neighboring states), then their chances of practicing governance would be possible; if conditions are favorable, other actors at the public and private spheres would also interact over an increasing range of issues. Thus states are the main source of regional governance, promoting collective action, only if and when they are comfortable with governance and transparency at their respective national levels. A main difference between regional grouping of developed states and developing states is the role of governance and civil society; in the latter it may be less prominent than in the former due to several factors, the most important being the political and legal constraints over the population.

Managing Regional Security

Political and security issues have been addressed by various regional institutions: by general purpose and integration motivated organizations like the European Community (EU) or by specific security alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although peace and security have been the concern of the international community, there is a lack of research and inquiry on regional governance in security issues.⁷ However, it is evident that the concept of security governance is gaining acceptance as even in the area of high politics that deal in security matters, pluralism is gradually seeping in. The developed societies that had established certain norms of behavior are leaving their influence over the others.⁸

Traditional domain of security dealt with the protection of the state and the regime in power; external defense and internal security were the vital focus of governments. Security as a concept in theory and practice was associated with the state; it was a state monopoly. In most developing countries, national security was deemed

⁶ Karen Mingst, *Essentials of International Relations, 2nd Edition* (New York: W W Norton, 2003), p. 248.

⁷ An innovative and interesting study is by Elke Krahnemann, *The Emergence of Security Governance in Post-Cold War Europe* (University of Birmingham: Dept of Political Science and International Studies, Working Paper, 2001).

⁸ For an insight into the concept of security see, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

'sensitive', 'confidential' and not for public concern. Thus general interest was low in such matters because those issues were 'closed'. There was very little opportunity for participation in discussion, what more of influencing decisions. Thus apathy was prevalent with the absence of any viable role for the interested or the initiated.

A number of factors have contributed to the changes in the perception of security and thus changes to the actors involved. The concept of security itself was widened. Security was not merely in terms of the military aspects of safeguarding the state from external and internal challenges, but it encompassed a comprehensive array of areas that had to be dealt with if the state were to feel 'secure'. Perhaps the end of the Cold War had some influence; the hard line military attitude, both among the developed and developing society, which defined security narrowly was slowly being broadened to include different criteria of security. The spread of information, technology, and changing attitudes through globalization exposed the vast areas that had been overlooked. Thus non traditional areas that had previously been underestimated came to occupy areas of prominence; issues like environmental degradation, poverty, ethnic strife, drug trafficking and smuggling became national security issues. Human security thus became an important agenda in addition to military security.⁹ As issues widened so did the actors – at all levels, global, national and regional. Governments needed a wider input from specialists to deal with 'security'. Besides, so-called security related issues could no longer be considered a monopoly as civil society demanded to be heard. If the demand did not come from within the state, then there were other equally interested actors elsewhere. International media and NGOs would expose issues where domestic actors could not. Thus gradually, governance has seen an increased role, not just nationally but also regionally in some parts of the world.

At the regional level various components of security governance can be identified. The most important would be the formal intra regional governmental activities. This is complemented by the informal networking of non governmental groups and their trans national activities; some may work independently while others may collaborate with the governments. Southeast Asia provides an interesting case study in regional security governance. When one traces the development of the regional organization, ASEAN from its origins to the present, from a period of denial that security was of major regional concern to one of incorporating various input into the regional decision making process, one can see a vast change over the decades.

The 1967 Declaration (that saw the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, among the five members) was silent on the issue of direct threat to the region or the need for security cooperation. Its publicly stated goal was to cooperate for peace and economic development in the region. There has been continual debate among observers as to whether it was the economic or the security concerns that promoted the establishment of the grouping. Security was not on its agenda in its initial existence even though parts of neighboring Southeast Asia were engulfed in the Vietnam War, and there were fears of its extension into the region; the 'domino' effect of the

⁹ For a discussion of human security and international relations see, Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism" in *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol 2, Issue 3, 2001, pp. 239-251.

spread of communism was also feared. (That was partially the reason ASEAN was viewed by many as a political/security organization rather than an economic one). From a cautious start to its current status as the driving force behind the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is indeed a case in regional security governance.

Regional Governance in ASEAN

ASEAN as a regional IGO is steered by national governments: it can only go as far as each member recognizes its utility. It does not have a supranational organization like the EU commission to formulate and implement regional integration policies nor does it have regional representation like the EU parliament. Each member state and its leaders are the collective decision-makers. That may account for the slow pace of common policy implementation and the avoidance of less popular programs that other member states may not be in favor. Thus areas for cooperation were generally limited to low politics that would not be termed 'sensitive'.¹⁰

National government leaders and foreign ministers had a firm grip on the management of the regional grouping. In fact for the first ten years it was only the foreign ministers who met regularly to chart the organization's course, with their national leaders' support for their action. Since 1976, the summit of heads of governments has become the highest official meeting in the organizational hierarchy. Major policy decisions are approved at the summit. The institutional apparatus of inter state linkages has remained as the foundation over the past three and a half decades, strengthening the grouping's multilateral but non binding structure.

The expansion of ASEAN's membership may have had some influence on the changing nature of its operating principles. As more and varied members joined the original grouping of five, there was dilution to the established methods of inter governmental decision-making: there was a need for modifying some of the practices to accommodate a complex environment of ten member states by 1999. The 'ASEAN Way' that had somehow been adopted without its actual nuances explained, had to be quietly side lined in favor of more practical approaches to addressing real problems of economic growth, employment, or recession. States with different mixes of political, economic and social systems invariably opt for a neutral method of organizational behavior. It may have also contributed to the ASEAN decision making process and structure becoming more inclusive and broader. It also resulted in a larger role for its regional secretariat in conducting certain functional activities independently.

¹⁰ ASEAN had had a slow membership growth until the mid 90's. The original five signatories in 1967 were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984. With an abrupt change in policy and ideological orientation, Vietnam was the first of the new members to join in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. The first six members had had time together to nurture their political and social linkages. The newer members are distinct in their economic and political systems; some observers fear the emergence of a two tier ASEAN, the old and the new members. Yet another state is hoping to become the eleventh member: East Timor.

Membership expansion has definitely not had its limit yet. Speculation as to when, not if, East Timor would become the eleventh has been high; it may not occur in the next couple of years. However, a larger expansion has already taken place (both in terms of population and economics). The ASEAN Plus Three has moved from an informal linkage beginning in 1997 to a more permanent feature, linking southeast and northeast Asia. (Dialogue partners, China, Japan, and South Korea are the three new associates). Perhaps that may have possible influence in the style and content of governance for a larger ASEAN. Other external involvement, for example, ASEAN members' participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APAC) or the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) may import certain governance practices into the regional system in Southeast Asia. Some ASEM participants from Europe have already expressed their displeasure at some of the non democratic practices in some ASEAN countries. It may have some long term effect eventually.

While not exactly emulating the style and structures of other organizations like the EU, ASEAN has had progressed incrementally both in the political, economic and other functional areas of cooperation. Its decision in 1992 to introduce the agenda for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is perhaps one of its major policy decisions for ASEAN for the new century. By the end of the first decade member states would have between zero and five percent tariffs on their intra regional trade, encouraging both domestic and foreign investments and overall economic development. Recognizing the fact that poverty and political instability are closely related, the targeting of development may contribute to a peaceful geo political environment. Higher national growth and wealth distribution would elevate poverty nationally; regionally, it would create economic viability and indirectly political interdependence. The expanding role for economic activities and trade relations has expanded the participation of the private sector and business community in the ASEAN process. AFTA and the various growth area initiatives at the sub regional level have widened the participatory process to include various actors, who were only in the sidelines, perhaps a decade ago.

The Security Agenda

Peace and security have been of concern to ASEAN states, even if they were not boldly spelled out initially. As mentioned above, matters of politics or security were the domain of the governments; hence they were not shared with other constituents in the society, nor were their opinions invited. That (military) security was of concern can be ascertained by a cursory look at the declarations and statements that resulted from the inter governmental meetings.¹¹

¹¹ For a new perspective on security in Southeast Asia see, Andrew T. H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, ed., *Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Select Publishing for IDSS, 2001). Also, William T Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun, ed., *Asia's Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).

The first major output was the declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 that asserted ASEAN's desire to be left out of big power rivalry in the region. This was at the height of the war in Indo China and directed at external players. A related concern that resulted in another treaty two decades later was the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone signed by all ten Southeast Asian countries, in 1975, even though not all had joined the grouping then. Although nuclear powers were expected to give their support none have done so as it lays down some stringent rules of behavior. However, ASEAN countries would observe the strict nuclear free environment. The most important document that was targeted at both the external as well as the regional states was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976. It laid down specific guidelines on inter state relations to promote non interference in the domestic affairs of member states, mutual respect for sovereignty and offered proposals for peaceful resolution of conflicts if they should arise. It was not only the first major document from the group's first summit of heads of governments, it also signaled its attitude and perception towards each other and its neighbors, not withstanding whether one was an ASEAN member or not. Political history had rendered each of the members with certain lingering suspicion and unresolved issues with its neighbors that the establishment of ASEAN had not entirely resolved.

Subsequent members have acceded to the treaty before seeking membership, making it a cardinal doctrine within ASEAN. A great deal of discussion and debate has followed on the principles of TAC, its contributions and detriments. It is one of the instruments that curtail discussion of critical issues in member states as it would amount to interference in their domestic affairs. While TAC had ambitious goals in conflict settlement through the High Council, it was not feasible since none would be brought before a council of fellow members.¹²

In short, ASEAN as a group would not deal with any issue deemed domestic or bilateral between members. A modified version of the High Council was put into practice: the Troika, constituting three foreign ministers, was specifically requested to consider the internal coup in Cambodia in 1997 (that over threw the existing government) and to offer mediation. It was a special mission, as Cambodia was about to join ASEAN and had to postpone its membership while it settled its domestic politics. ASEAN had to ensure that political credibility would not be hurt with an errant member and thus the troika succeeded in ensuring an elected government was in force before Cambodia was admitted. In the case of criticism against the military government in Myanmar, ASEAN's answer was that it used 'constructive engagement', while on the issue of East Timor when it was under Indonesian rule, the response – silence.

Perhaps one conflict area where some of its members had both intra as well extra links was over the competing claims in the South China Sea. China was a major claimant, laying claim to the entire Spratly archipelago, while four of the ASEAN members had bilateral contentions. Dealing with a big state may have spurred ASEAN into some collective action, initially issuing the Declaration on the South China Sea

¹² Only some of the more important declarations/treaties are highlighted here. For a full listing see The ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Document Series*. Also, www.aseansec.org for more details on ASEAN.

(1992) calling for peaceful resolution to the territorial claims. In the late 1990s ASEAN proposed a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea for all parties to observe; a draft statement was presented in 1999 but China did not agree to it. More consultations have been held and China has forwarded its own proposals. The original Code might be modified to a Declaration. However, there is optimism for better results, especially after China became a Dialogue partner, and more recently after China's ASEAN Plus Three relationship, and an imminent free trade arrangement with AFTA.

The latest in inter state arrangement is that between the ASEAN group and its dialogue partner, and fellow ARF member, the United States on cooperation to fight terrorism, issued at the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2002. Termed the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, the counter terrorism pact seeks mutual help through information and intelligence sharing. It was a gain for the United States in its post September 11 fight against terrorism. Although it was partly the efforts of the US government in winning the ASEAN support, ASEAN governments had also initiated various regional meetings on counter terrorism. For example, a trilateral pact between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to fight terrorism and transnational crime was initiated in Malaysia in May 2002.

Perhaps no other institution than the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) is a symbol of ASEAN's intention of addressing security issues in the Asia Pacific region with other global partners. Established in 1994 and currently with a membership of 23 states, the ARF is an arrangement for cooperative security through confidence building, preventive diplomacy and peaceful conflict settlement. Government leaders repeatedly assure that the ARF is more than mere talk-shop, and that it actually discusses security concerns openly by its members. But bilateral disputes are not its concern yet. The ARF has the potential for a macro level security organization if ASEAN is confident it can still retain its influence over it. Some have even suggested it may become like the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, as the premier security forum in the region, it is also unique in that it was created through joint efforts of various interested parties both within and outside the formal governmental structures of member states.

Civil Society and Security

As mentioned in the outset, ASEAN as an association that had limited opportunities for pluralistic input. But the differences between government and non government were gradually reduced in some areas of common venture. The ARF was one such area. In the past ASEAN's security related dialogue with its partners was handled at the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and in the 1980s it had been dominated by discussion of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. With the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines, and the assertion of claims by China in the South China Sea, the PMC was expected to deal with the increasing concerns of ASEAN states. However, it was not conceived for that role. The PMC was designed to consider bilateral issues in economics and development but had unwittingly

been involved in the Kampuchean (Cambodian) issue. A fresh approach was needed for security matters outside the PMC.¹³

The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) had been meeting to discuss regional issues and had suggested that ASEAN raise some of those issues with its partners. Heeding the general mood of post cold war environment, security was an obvious item on the agenda for the Summit of 1992. With the increased interest in security, and the active role of the ASEAN-ISIS, (comprising Think Tanks in the member states), the organization was receptive to seeking the views of its members and partners to convene a meeting in 1993. Thus researchers and academics have had a direct input in the ARF and its origins. The ISIS has also been called upon to deliver assessments of security and in devising strategic plans, including the 1995 Concept Paper. The non governmental involvement has continued with input from other sources. For instance the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) representing analysts and academics from the ARF member states have published recommendations for improving the working of the ARF.¹⁴ A recent study by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore submitted a set of proposals on the ARF to the annual meeting of its leaders in 2002.¹⁵ Entitled 'A New Agenda for the Asean Regional Forum' it, among others, suggested the establishment of a secretariat and a Risk Reduction Centre. With structural and procedural improvements the ARF may assume a greater role in the security arena of Asia Pacific. It also has become a plural organization with active participation from various sectors.

Concerned groups have in fact contributed to security dialogues on a number of occasions. Semi official-cum-academic meetings termed Track Two involved Think Tank personnel and government officials in their personal capacities. An example of the Track Two initiatives hosted by Indonesia considered issues like the Spratly claims as Indonesia was not one of the claimants. It was semi official in the fact that government officials would invariably carry their country's national interests, but could be more frank and less committed to their proposals; at the same time there would be a wider spectrum of views from the cross-section of analysts and academics. There is even a Track Three in existence; an ASEAN People's Assembly has held two meetings with the intention of contributing to an open discussion of vital issues. As more people, beyond the specialists and analysts are involved, a greater sense of commitment to the success of ASEAN seems to be prevalent among the population of the region.

¹³ The ASEAN governments were so preoccupied with the Kampuchean issue from 1979 till about 1989 that critiques referred to ASEAN as the one-issue organization. ASEAN led the international condemnation of Vietnam for invading and occupying Cambodia. It helped to install a coalition government in exile and was one of the parties to the Paris Peace Conference that ensured UN involvement and a peaceful resolution of the problem. ('Cambodia' was again used after the new government came into force).

¹⁴ The ARF has 23 members: the ten ASEAN members, Australia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea and United States.

¹⁵ *The Straits Times*, 28 June, 2002.

Conclusion

The ASEAN outlook has definitely changed since its inception. Domestic, regional and global issues have broadened its perception. A wide spectrum of issues are constantly being added – for instance trans border concerns on environmental degradation, drug trafficking, human smuggling and the like. Agendas have been widened to include not just territorial and ideological threats but also human security issues. ASEAN leaders have shown willingness to allow a certain degree of participation by civil society at the regional level – a vast improvement to the early years. The problem now may be that civil society itself is not adequately organized and ready to respond effectively and explore a pluralistic tradition as in the West.

The fundamental questions that need to be addressed before concluding are: To what extent is governance evident? Is regional decision making accountable and transparent? Are there ample opportunities for citizen input in issues and in the peaceful resolution of disputes? Will national governments be tolerant of views and not brand such input as interference? Do the public and private actors have a common definition of security and see a common goal towards peace in the region?

The above are not easy questions. If security is the concern of all, then all sectors within the region have a role to play. Challenges to security have to be met and management of disputes handled effectively with participation by relevant players. ASEAN has shown some positive changes towards regional governance even if it is moving at a slow pace.